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" LAOKOON" AND THE PRIOR QUESTION 
The first gift of criticism is perspective. By perspective 
I mean a comprehensive view of related matters shown in their 
just and intelligible proportion. To attain such views in any 
department which falls within our human ken is no light task. 
The matters considered must be seen, as Arnold would have us 
see life, steadily and whole; and steadiness implies balance in the 
observer, no less than wholeness depends upon the accessibility 
of the phenomena. It is a happy union, therefore, of the per-
sonality and the season which produces the truly great critic. 
The source and fountain of European criticism, Aristotle's 
Poetics, appears just after the greatness of Greek literature had 
run its course, when Greek epic and drama lay before the observer 
with all the completeness which was to be preserved to posterity. 
Longinus On the Sublime-if we are to assume the probable date 
-follows the entire flowering of the pagan classics. Lessing's 
Laokoon, publIshed in 1766, is contemporary with the rococo 
decadence of the new classicism which came into being with the 
Renaissance. Each of these treatises is something in the nature 
of an obituary disquisition, for each is concerned with the por-
trayal of excellences which, at least in the form that is foremost 
in the critic's mind, are not to appear in the literary expression 
of the ensuing age-excellences which are in a bodily sense dead 
and buried, and if at all subject to resurrection only so in some 
decidedly novel incarnation. It is partly for this reason, I fancy, 
that the panegyric temper of Longinus so movingly affects us. 
And is it not fairly obvious also that the recency of the 
development considered, as of a bereavement not yet clearly 
realised, unconsciously disturbs the critical office? I would not 
say that in the case of such minds as those of Aristotle and 
Longinus and Lessing the criticism is warped by its circum-
stances-that is too strong an expression; but it does not seem 
unfair to affirm that each of these critics writes with a local and 
circumstantial bias which modifies the final value of his per-
spective. Aristotle clearly gives us no standard for judgment of 
Greek poetry as a whole (which, doubtless, he never intended to 
give); his interest is centralised in the public, the agonistic, types 
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of composition-in the dithyramb, in the epic, in tragedy,-and 
consequently his criticism elevates the dramatic elements in 
literature and judges merits by dramatic effects: ~6oc; rather than 
4'u(J'tc;, man rather than nature, becomes for him the proper 
theme of literary art,-though perhaps we had better say that the 
poems which went under the title IIcpl <Pu(J'cwc;, even when they 
attained to such epical imaginings as appear in the works of Empe-
docles, seemed to him to involve no proper artistic problem; for 
with Aristotle as with Plato the problem of art is a problem of 
ethics, and the poems on nature were to be tried before the 
metaphysical tribunal of truth rather than subjected to the 
resthetico ethical adjudication of xaAoX&ra6ta. 
Longinus clearly has more feeling for nature (in an resthetical 
sense) than has Aristotle. But Longinus, no less than Aristotle, 
has partialities which constitute a bias. For if Aristotle is a 
spectator, Longinus is a listener: it is the oration which is fore-
most in his imagination, and he hears all poetry as from the 
mouth of a declaimer. And in nature what he most admires is a 
certain cosmic magniloquence, of thunder and flame and of the 
moving sea, susceptible of imitation in the high speech of mortal 
men. The world of nature is after all but a setting for the works 
of man, and if these are now to be celebrated from the rostrum 
rather than upon the stage the change is but one of the manner, 
not of the matter of the art. 
Said in all fairness, Aristotle),nd Longinus give us the best 
measure of ancient criticism; they define for us the classic con-
ception of literature, as essentially human and essentially dra-
matic. I do not mean to say that no other forms appear in 
antiquity; I have already cited the poems on nature; and many 
minor modes, lyric, meditative, passively descriptive, find their 
due examples. But were we to excerpt from classical literature 
the elements neglected by Aristotle and Longinus we should have 
taken away little that is of more than antiquarian interest; the 
vital body would still remain. 
It is worth while to get clearly in mind this essential classicisD;l 
before turning to Lessing, for the feeling for what is human and 
dramatic is the very pillar of Lessing's criticism. Viewing 
ancient literature at a distance, he could see it in truer perspec-
tive; and he had besides the advantage of comparison with later 
literary developments. Further, Lessing had seen the rise of 
that consciousness of the separateness of art from the run of 
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htm1an interests which has given us the domain. of resthetics as a 
distinct domain; so that where the ancients saw only a problem 
of the good we can see a problem of beauty, and by comparing 
art with art-a task which they never seriously attempted-we 
can analyse beauty from diverse situations. We should expect, 
then, that Lessing, having the equipped mind and having the 
materials before him, when he undertakes his discussion of the 
"boundaries of the arts," would give us a more capable and 
satisfying depiction of the office of literature than even the 
greatest of his antique predecessors. We should expect him to be 
free from the adventitious and circumstantial, in so far as this 
may be allowed to man; and perhaps the highest tribute that 
could be paid to Lessing's value is the fact that a capable editor, 
a hundred and fifty years after the Laokoon first appeared,t in 
giving us an edition "purged of the ephemeral" finds so little of 
what was printed on the original page to be excluded from the 
modem. 
In Lessing, we may reasonably assume, classicism finds its 
central expositor. And in undertaking a review of the works of 
some contemporary critics, whose conflicts largely turn upon 
their conceptions of "classic" and its assumed antithetical, 
"romantic," we may best serve our purpose by a restatement of 
the main thesis of Lessing's work,-all the more in point from the 
fact that a notable modem book by Professor Irving Babbitt 
challenges the comparison in its title, The New Laokoon. 
I 
It is the genius of the German to generate an atmosphere of 
profundity about the simplest ideas. Most Teutonic thinkers 
are men of one idea, but that idea is so patiently dichotomised 
and so ingeniously elaborated that it ends by becoming a system; 
for them experience is confounded with logistic and metaphysics 
identified with Schematismus. It is doubtless for this reason 
that the German philosophers are of all men the easiest to 
epithet; a word or a phrase will carry the whole burden of their 
thought, whose formidable outward show is only the gaseous 
enlargement of its ponderable substance. 
Lessing is a German. I do not mean that he lacks matter; 
but compare him with Aristotle or Longinus and he reads thin; 
Z Laokoon. Edited by William Guild Howard. 
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it is, after all, the garb of learning with which he invests his idea, 
rather than its own native richness, that makes its impressiveness. 
I speak of "his idea" in the singular, for he shares the peculiarity 
of his countrymen, and the Laokoon is very obviously a book of 
one thought. Indeed, he himself reduces it to an epigram: "Die 
Zeitfolge ist das Gebiet des Dichters, sowie der Raum das Gebiet des 
Malers"-"Temporal succession is the province of the poet, as 
space is that of the painter." The whole essay is but an elabora-
tion of this conception: time is the "pure form" of poetry, space 
is the "pure form" of pictorial art. 
I cannot strictly call this Kantianism, though the application 
of Kant's Transcendental }!Esthetic to the problems of art must 
have produced exactly this conclusion; for while Lessing had 
some personal acquaintance with Kant, the Laokoon antedates 
the Kritik by some fifteen years, and indeed is contemporary 
with Kant's first puzzling over inner and outer space. But the 
analogy is none the less interesting, showing as it does how 
inevitably the Teuton of the period solved his empirical problems 
by transcendental reason-so explaining in advance, what any 
reader of Lessing must feel, that his illustrations are chosen by 
his thesis, and his thesis not, as would be the temper of our times, 
framed upon the materials. 
But let us tum for a moment to the matter. Lessing is dis-
cussing the limits of the arts, and he makes of these psychological 
limits. The imitations (Lessing accepts the classical definition of 
art as imitation) of plastic and pictorial art must be apprehensible 
in a single glance·; the powers of the eye, which is the organ by 
which we perceive objects in space as unitary objects, themselves 
set the bounds for unity in'spatial art; and these bounds are best, 
described as the limits of what can be embraced in a moment of 
clear seeing, Spatial art is, then, momentary art. The moment 
is indeed the very soul of the art, and its choice the crux of 
inspiration. It must not be a transitory, a temporal, an active 
moment; rather it must be a moment of pause, a suggestive, or, 
as Lessing calls it, a "fruitful" moment,-one in which physical 
action has ceased, but, as it were, in a suspense which indefinitely 
challenges and intensifies imaginative activity. One of Lessing's 
surest passages characterises this moment: 
"That alone is the fruitful moment which gives the imagination free play. 
The more we see the more must we be able to add in~hought, and the more we 
add in thought just so much more must we feel that we see. In the whole 
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course of a passion there is no moment which has less of this advantage than 
has its highest stage. Beyond that there is nothing, and to reveal the utmost 
to the eve is to bind the wings of phantasy and to necessitate that, since it 
cannot pass beyond the sensible impression, it should busy itself with weaker 
images for which the visible fulness of the expression serves as a limitation. It 
Lessing illustrates this fruitful m(i)ment by the Laocoon 
group. The artists have seized upon the instant before struggle 
has passed into surrender: Laocoon's mps are open, but the 
despairing shriek is not yet uttered. And he illustrates again 
from the art of Tinomachus: Ajax is depicted in dejection, con-
templating self-destruction in the moment after yielding to his 
berserk passion, he is not shown in the midst of his rage; Medea 
is shown before the murder of her children, torn between mother-
love and jealousy, the only moment which our sympathies will 
endure. 
But, 'says Lessing, poetry is not confined to such restricted 
moments; poetry can legitimately depict the whole suffering 
of Laocoon, the whole passion of Ajax or ~~dea. Indeed, poetry 
must not concentrate upon the single momen,t if it .is to produc~ 
its own proper effect. Its business isnot·to compete with paint-
ing, but to imitate that of which the painter's art 'is incapable; 
and that is action, moving events,' temporal reality. Objeqts 
contiguous or with parts contiguous, are bodies, the visible 
peculiarities of which are the theme of plastic and pictorial art; 
objects sequent or with parts sequent are actions, and these are 
the peculiar objects of poetic art. . 
Here we have, in its a priori simplicity, Lessing's Grundbegriff; 
and it is not without significance, touching such modes of meta-
physic, that the law is no sooner laid down tha~ it is modified. ' 
For all objects are both contiguous in space and sequent in time; 
each moment is an enchained appearance, the effect of its pre-
decessor, the cause of its successor. Hence painting can in fact 
represent action, "aber nur andeulungsweise durch Korper, "-but 
only suggestively through objects; while poetry, no Jess, may 
depict bodies, II aber nur andeutungsweise durch Handlungen, " 
-but only suggestively through aGtions. Thus Raphael, in his 
treatment of draperies, shows thE; last preceding movement of the 
limb; Homer, on occasion, uses three and even four pictorial 
adjectives. The rule of practice is that the two linked moments 
which the painter is permitted must be so' near in time that we 
see them as one without shock, while.the successive images of the 
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poet must be presented in words so interlinked that we seem to 
hear them as one. 
Alas for metaphysics and the high a priori road! The clear- I-
cut boundaries between the arts are no sooner envisaged than 
they shimmer and fuse and fluctuate away. For the limits which 
Lessing would impose are not outer, but inner; not in the nature 
of the matters of art, but in the power of the artist's imagination. 
If your artist has the compelling imagination of a Michelangelo; 
we can see without shock, in one graphic presentation, moments 
of time so far apart as birth and death, Creation and the Day of 
Judgment, while the scenic power of words is so chief an 
ornament of literature that we can hardly conceive of great 
poetic imagination apart from its exercise. Indeed, Lessing 
erases his own demarcation when he maintains that the poet 
"will make the ideas, which he arouses in us, so living that we 
seem to feel the true sensible impression of the objects them-
selves, and in this moment of illusion cease to be conscious of his 
words which are but the means that he employs to this end." 
If the ultimate effect of art is a moment of illusion, the agency by 
which this illusion is produced should be a matter of indifference. 
The truth is that the moment of physical contemplation 
accompanied by imaginative zeal, which is for Lessing the 
proper effect of the painter's art, and the moment of vivid 
imagery accompanied by oblivescence of the words, which is for 
him the life of poetry, these two moments are one and the same; 
they are occasioned by diverse agents, but they are like ex-
periences, ~nd it is impossible to determine from the experience 
what the agent ought to b&.o In words which cannot be bettered, 
Herder put the central truth: "If action be the proper subject 
of poetic art, yet ca~ this subject never be determined through 
the dry concept of successiqn; force is the midpoint of its sphere. 
And this for£e is th~ force which cleaves to the inwardness of 
words; it is the magic which, through phantasy and memory, 
works upon the soul; it is the being of poesy." 
If we pause to ask ourselves why, with all its apparent 
strength, Lessing's argument analyses so weakly, the answer will 
be found to turn upon two deficiencies. 
The first of these is of a material nature. Lessing's outlook 
upon art is woefully limited. With all his erudition-and no 
man can speak of it without respe~t-he seems to have no bal-
anced experience of literature. For him poetry is dramatic 
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poetry; it is the poetry of action, and that action human action. 
Here Lessing is at one with the ancients; here lies his classicism. 
But surely it is a defect for a modern critic to overlook, even if he 
be not drawn to, that body of lyric and devotional expression 
which makes so great part of what the world counts its poetic 
riches. Similarly, on the side of art, Lessing seems to see in the 
painter only a possible illustrator,-not of poetry, but of ideas; 
his contention is that poetry cannot be pictorially illustrated, 
although there are ideas which can be depicted. To a degree this 
contention is justified, but to make it the foundation of a philoso-
phy of art implies small acquaintance with the aims and themes 
of the painter. In brief, Lessing takes human forms and human 
conduct, the scenes and actions which make life, and he shows 
how in dramatic portrayal spectacle and book supplement 
one another; what he gives is admirable as a guide to truth 
in the theatre, but it is a slight survey of the whole field of 
art. 
The second deficiency in Lessing is one of psychology. I 
know that "psychology" is nowadays a term to conjure with, 
and that its charge of knowledge is overblown with bosh and 
bluster; but the charge of knowledge is, after all, genuine; and 
if the critics insist upon being psychological it is but in nature 
that the psychologist retort upon them. In the case of Lessing 
his ignorance is quite pardonable in the man but a heavy burden 
upon his theories. For in the first place the whole assumption of 
the momentariness of our visual perceptions of objects, as unities 
or entireties, is a false assumption; yet he makes it the support 
of his theory of painting and sculpture. And in the second place 
the notions upon which he frames his theory of poetry-notions 
of the laboriousness of visual imagination and of its inability to 
compose unities competing with those of sense,-these notions 
must strike with astonishment many of his fellow-men whose 
experiences are quite the reverse. The truth appears to be that 
Lessing was what is technically known as a motile, or movement-
minded man, one who thinks in terms of action rather than of 
sense: "In general," he says, "we can remember movements 
more easily and in a livelier manner than forms or colours, "-a 
statement which may very likely have been true of himself but is 
certainly not true of many another. It is obvious that no man 
can safely erect a theory of art upon his own idiosyncracies, and 
Lessing himself is never wiser than in saying, " Nichts ist betrug- ~ 
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licher als allgemeine Gesetze fur. unsere Empfindungen "-" Noth-
ing is more deceptive than general rules for our sensibilities." 
II 
Professor Irving Babbitt entitles his essay The New Laokoon 
as an indication of his intention, with an added century and a 
half of literary history in perspective, once again to take up the 
discussion of the boundaries of the arts. The essay divides into 
two parts: in the first of these, entitled "The Pseudo-Classic' 
Confusion of the Arts," he analyses the conditions and theories 
which led up to Lessing's criticism, whose value and shortcom-
ings he appraises; in the second part, entitled "The Romantic 
Confusion of the Arts," he resumes the developments of the 
nineteenth century and attacks the errors into which he deems 
our time to have fallen. 
The argument of the first part is to the effect that the" clas-
sicism" of post-Renaissance times is essentially a false classicism. 
It confuses the arts externally and formally,-a confusion due, 
in large part, to its mistaken understanding of the Greek.concep-
tion of "imitation" as the first definition of art: this doctrine of 
imitation was regarded as throwing the whole stress of resthetic 
creation upon the element of reproduction, either a formal copy-
ing of classic models or a no less formal symbolism of la belle 
nature; that is, of nature regarded as a gracious theme for the 
display of artistic tact and taste. The result is obvious and 
calculated fiction rather than true imaginative illusion-a chi-
mrera-like consumption of "second intentions" rather than a 
vital interpretation of the idea in nature. It was this formalism, 
based on an external and mechanical conception of imitation, 
which begot the pictorial poetry and poeticised painting attacked 
by Lessing. Lessing "is as willing as any critic of the Renais-
sance to grant that poetry is a painting and an imitation," but 
"he is not willing to take the next step, and establish a formal 
resemblance between words and figures of speech in poetry and 
colours in painting." Lessing has done little more, adds Pro-
fessor Babbitt, than develop the aphorism of La Fontaine: 
, , Words and colours are not alike, nor are eyes ears"; his dis-
cussion is really confined to the realm of sense-organ and stimu-
Ius, the realm of experience remains unanalysed. 
And it is precisely in the realm of experience, in an inward 
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and psychical sense, that Romanticism creates its confusions. 
In place of neo-classic "imitation, " it exalts" spontaneity"; in 
place of a mind which is a blank tablet for outer impressions, it 
offers a soul iti.lmured in its "tower of ivory"; in place of a chi-
mrera feeding on "second intentions," it gives us a monstrous 
inner assimilation of "first intentions. " "Back to Nature" is 
its cry, but the nature to which it would return is unconfined 
and lawless, animistic rather than humanistic, with "higher" and 
"lower" inextricably interfused. It is a sort of post-Kantian 
" absorption" and "transmutation" in which things and ideas, 
appearances and realities, disappear in an absolute blend, which 
merits its name of "absolute" only because it is indescribable. 
Word-painting, programme music, works in which sounds are 
meant to be seen and colours to be heard, all these are sympto-
matic confusions: "as a man thus melts into nature," says Mr. 
Babbitt, "his vocabulary melts into nature with him and takes 
on all its variegated hues." 
This extraordinary development our critic finds to be but 
the outward expression of a psychic mutation which has altered 
our faculties. He says: 
" The inward eye of which WordsV{orth speaks was comparatively dormant 
in men before the last century; since" then it has been so developed as to be-
come a sort of new sense that brings he objects of outer nature into contact 
with the soul through the medium imaginative illusion, refining them in the 
process and attuning them h emotion. This new sense is in itself 
delightful and legitimate, and tli very with which it is associated has its 
own uses. The romantic error has been to make of this revery the serious sub-
stance of life instead of its occasional solace; to set up the things that are 
below the reason as a substitute for those that are above; in short, to tum the 
nature cult into a religion." 
In a further passage the diagnosis is expanded: 
" If all the arts are thus restless and impressionistic, the reason is not far to 
seek: it is because the people who practise these arts and for whom they are 
practised are themselves living in an impressionistic flutter. If the arts lack 
dignity, centrality, repose, it is because the men of the present have no centre, 
no sense of anything fixed or permanent either within or without themselves, 
that they may oppose to the flux of phenomena and the torrent of impressions. 
In a word, if confusion has crept into the arts, it is merely a special aspect of a 
more general malady, of that excess of sentimental and scientific natural-
ism from which, if my diagnosis is correct, the occidental world is now 
suffering. " 
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It is obvious from these passages that the author of The New 
Laokoon is, like his predecessor, a classicist in the sense that his 
feeling for art is merged in his feeling for human conduct: that 
moral and cesthetic problems are identical. In the concluding 
chapters of the book this classicism comes to explicit expression. 
Neo-Classicism and Romanticism, he argues, stands each for a 
half-truth: the need of form and the need of matter. But in 
divorcing these complementary needs, each movement has fallen 
into error: formalism, the result of an indolence of the imagina-
tion, is the error of the false classicists; "eleutheromania "-" an 
undefined liberty and an unselective sympathy, "-the result 
of an indolence of the reason, is the sin of the romanticists. But 
there is a happy mean: the humanistic law of concentration and 
selection, of a will intent upon truth. Real freedom is that of a 
spirit which knows and owns its limitations; the need of the hour 
is form, in the Aristotelian sense, which will permit sanity and 
encourage humane feeling in the midst of the confusions of sense 
and spirit which Romanticism has engendered. "If art is to have 
humane purpose . . . intuitions of sense must come under the 
control of the higher intuitions." Or, as he elsewhere says, 
"What we have in the great artists is the intellectualising of 
sensations, and not . . . the sensualising of the intellect." 
Finally: "The Greeks at their best had humane standards and 
held them flexibly. They thu~ effected in some degree that 
mediation between the One and the Many that is the highest 
wisdom of life. " 
III 
In our estimate of Lessing we criticised his defective psy-
chology. To a degree this was an incidental criticism; for 
Lessing's main contention is not a subtle one; and since his 
analysis turns upon the nature of the cesthetic stimulus rather 
than the cesthetic experience, his defects, in the matter of psy-
chology, limit the application rather than the essential truth of 
his theories. But the case is obviously different with the more 
recent critic. Professor Babbitt transfers the discussion bodily 
to a psychical realm; the romantic confusion of the arts is, he 
tells us, an inner and experiential confusion; it is due to un focal 
thinking and feeling, not to confounded sight and sound. Very 
clearly, the value of criticism from this point of view must 
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depend upon its psychological truth: whether intentionally or not 
the critic has diverted his profession from an analysis of matters 
to an analysis of mind; he has transformed criticism into psy-
chology, and it is reasonable that his thought should be met 
on his own grounds. 
I may illustrate the psychological turn by certain current 
antitheses: there is "inner" and "outer," intellect and sense, 
feeling and will, imagination and reason; and if we will apply 
th/'ie terms according to the formula, we shall find that the 
volitional, intellectual, and reasonable is the proper definition of 
what is classical and humane and in some precious meaning 
"higher, " while the emotional, sensible, and imaginative defines 
w hat is roman tic and naturalistic and axiomatically "lower" in 
our mortal experience. When the matter is put in this bald form, 
one begins to suspect that our modern mode is not wholly re-
deemed from the fallacious seductiveness of Schematismus! At 
the least, we are on our guard against that illusion of order which 
is so often introduced into complex subjects by the deft arrange-
men t of categories . 
. " If there is, as I suspect, an error underlying this neat itemising 
of resthetic experience, it is yet an error peculiar to no one critic; 
and before endeavouring to lay it open, we may pause to consider 
other instances. Professor Babbitt (accepting his own defini-
tions) is a stout classicist, while Professor Fairchild discusses The 
Making of Poetry from a point of view which can be only that of 
the unsubdued romantic. For him poetry is indefinable; it 
"begins and ends in feeling" ; whatever is to be said about it must 
be said from an external, from a circumferential point of view. 
However, since this outer attitude permits his book to analyse 
the elements, creation, value, and even the "real nature" of 
poetry, it cannot be supposed that we have lost much in losing 
the" definability" of the poet's art. To begin with, the material 
of poetry is mental images; the language which stimulates these 
is merely an outer and servile circumstance. But these images 
must be more than replications of nature if we are to have poetry; 
they must be "personalisations "-that is, absorptions of nature 
by the poet's personality. "Everywhere there is a going out of 
my own nature," writes our critic; "I identify myself with all 
that exists in thought, action, or person, not my own. Every-
where I carryon a process of self-projection; I put myself into 
the life and action of people and of things; I humanise them. " 
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Corollary to this is the notion that form, verse-form, is purely 
adventitious: "versifying," we are told, "finds its most satis-
factory explanation, not through consideration of its external 
form, but in terms of its inner effects." This analysis leads up to 
the doctrine that the nature of poetry is "self-realisation,"-
poetry is "a form of pleasurable and unified self-realisation" 
which "must represent either something new that is valued, or, 
if not something new, something known and wished for, but not 
consistently attained in feeling, thought, or action. " 
It would be difficult to find a more unadulterated statement 
of the "romantic" point of view than is this of Professor Fair-
child's,-which, it is but fair to add, he supports with a liberal 
analysis of materials drawn chiefly from sources which are con-
fessedly of the romantic movement. We can imagine that 
Professor Babbitt might feel nervous at Professor Fairchild's pre-
emption of the term" humanism" to designate his philosophy of 
art; for" self-projection" and" self-realisation, " in the expansive 
and catholic sense employed by the latter, is as far as can be from 
that" concentration of the will" which is the former's definition 
of humanism. But after all can an impartial arbiter deny the 
right of either conception? "Concentration of the will" is a 
reasonable interpretation of [J.'1)oh a"(Clv, but "self-projection" 
may no less reasonably be inferred from" esse is percipi," and each 
of these rests with equal right upon the prior humanistic maxim, 
"Know thyself." And it is not without point that the critical 
philosophies of our two exponents, though following very differ-
ent routes, are altogether neighbourly in their conclusions; for 
between" that mediation between the One and the Many that is 
the highest wisdom of life" for Professor Babbitt, and the 
"feeling of unity attained and continuity of experience em-
phasised" in which Professor Fairchild sees the value of poetry, 
the difference is verbal rather than speculative. 
As much cannot be said of another book which also must be 
classed as the expression of an unsubdued romantic. The very 
title of Max Eastman's Enjoyment of Poetry is meant to shunt it 
off from all those philosophies of art which centre on will and 
reason; in place of these, emotion and the senses are for Dr. 
Eastman warp and woof of the poetic fabric. He begins his 
discussion with a sharp severation of the poetic from the practical; 
people are of two kinds, "some of them are chiefly occupied with L 
attaining ends, some with receiving experiences"; it is the latter 
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who compose the tribe-of poets. Now the distinguishing mark 
of the two temperaments is their use of names; the practical man 
will select names which familiarise "adjustments," the poetical 
will employ epithets which challenge "realisation." "Is the 
right name of water wet, or is it H20?" Here we have the 
antithesis set: a perfect algebra is the ideal of the practical reason, 
while poetry is "the art of calling names." 
We are not surprised on being led to infer from this that 
Homer and Shakespeare get their lesson from folklore, or that 
poetic wisdom is most certain to be found on the lips of babes, 
savages, and yokels. "Poetry is of necessity the language both 
of children who do not understand the general names of things, 
and savages who have not decided upon those names"; and 
"poetry is a countryman, and greets every experience by its own 
name." Framed from this calibre the essence of poetry is the 
monosyllables of thought; it is an art of words, of morsels succu-
lent or bitter, each giving as its delight some special delice or 
poignancy-and if my talk seem to savour closely of the cuisine, 
it is yet untrue to our critic's conception only in that for him 
poetry makes real for us objects of sense which can but verbally 
pass our lips. "Millions of so-called' stories' are current among 
men, women, and children of which the climax is not humour but 
poetry, a vivid filth. "I Plato, we will remember, not even for the 
sake of scientific consistency would admit "hair" and ":filth" 
into the aristocracy of the Ideas,-and perhaps this is a measure 
of the distance we have come unto a time when poetic effulgence 
is found even upon offal. 
To be sure, ideas have a kind of place in Dr. Eastman's 
theory. They are not valued in poetry for their use-which is 
their essence-but for what is adventitious to their being; the 
poet" loves the idea, as he loves the thing, for its suggestiveness, 
its discursiveness, its inapplicabilities." "The realisation of ideas 
is a part of the advent:ure of being"; but it is made sufficiently 
clear to us that, on the whole, it is much the poorer part. The 
1 Our author adds, "This is the dry rot of poetry." But on his theory, 
there is no reason for this judgment except his temperamental dislike of filth. 
On the other hand, taking· his own valuation of words for their suggestive 
qualities, there is perfect right on the part of anyone who cares vigorously to 
deny that" filth" is ever" poetry." The word poetry, as Eastman's description 
acknowledges, has won for itself a flavour which distinctly proclaims that 
it has something to do with beauty,-a flavour, I may add, upon which 
the author often, if unconsciously, relies to persuade assent to his judgments. 
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qualities which make the poet are sensitiveness, sympathy, and 
self-knowledge; and while each of these qualities is excellent in 
itself, it is evident, from the limitation of the catalogue, which 
way the wind sets: sensitiveness is the quality of a mind percep-
tually resilient, sympathy calls for quick-welling emotion, while 
self-knowledge is here no Greek thing, but something more surely 
the possession of indigenes and sucklings than of sages and kings. 
In fact, what is called mind-and in particular, poetic mind-
"is itself a part of things" as far as these engender experience. 
H The poetic impulse is a love of that experience for its own sake. 
Poetic creation begins in us when we marry, with such love, the 
images of memory to the impressions of sense, and when to this 
union we set the seal of a vivid and communicable name we 
are poets in the full and divine sense. Weare makers of a 
world. " 
Here poetry is not, as it is with Professor Fairchild, an out-
ward flowing of the ego, familiarising and personalising a world of 
unillumined externalities; rather it is the chaotic precipitate of 
mind particles upon the things themselves, or (perhaps more in 
the spirit of Dr. Eastman) it is the myriad dew crystallised upon 
the world's gardens for the morning's intoxication;-one jewelled 
moment it sparkles to the sun's flame, then vanishes forever. 
Here is no talk of concentration, but only of dissipation; nothing 
to be garnered or gained, but all for profligate spending. 
Nor does the will fare better than the reason in the com-
pounding of the poetic experience. To be sure, we are told that 
poetry is a manifestation of the "will to live"; but we recognise 
this will as the blind and distempered passion for life philoso-
phised by Schopenhauer rather than any guided control of con-
duct. Life is a reasonless adventure, with surety only in its present 
gift, and poetry, whose office it is to catch the momentary glint 
of momentary things, obtains its excellence just in "a vivifying of 
present experience in an adventurous world." If poetry has no 
portion with purpose, naturally it has· none with consecutive 
action. It was the accident of Greek form that made Aristotle 
regard tragedy as poetry, according to Dr. Eastman; narrative 
is not properly poetry at all, but a satisfaction of the appetites 
of the will; Shakespeare is the poet of action not because he is a 
creator of drama, but because he excels all others in galvanising 
thought by images of action: " Look to Shakespeare for the poetry 
of verbs." The upshot of it all is that" poetry is a series of 
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pictures accompanied by appropriate music, "-which is a flaring 
defiance to Lessing and Mr. Babbitt. 
By the time we have been taught that poetry is the parti-
coloured babble of infants and primitives, that it is akin to magic 
and adventure and Bacchanalian orgy, that even the rhythm, 
which seems to give it tautness and form, is but a lethargising 
hypnosis, by this time we begin to misdoubt the very possibility 
of such a thing as a poem or a poetic work; and, despite the relish 
of many palatable phrases and some fair-said truths, in the pres-
ence of the obvious fact of literature, we turn from the Enjoyment 
of Poetry with the feeling that the most its author has done is to 
make a saucy statement of a bad case. 
IV 
The question which naturally occurs to us sociable human 
beings, when we encounter sharp antitheticals contrariwise shap-
ing our conduct and conceptions, is whether there may not be 
some comfortable and compromising middle way, friendly to each 
extreme. William Allan Neilson's The Essentials of Poetry is a 
search for such a via media between "classicism" and "romanti-
cism. " Neilson agrees with the current diagnosis in making 
imagination the distinctive mark of romanticism; it is associated 
with the "rediscovery of the soul" and the "return to Nature," 
with emotionalism and naturalism, and with that expansiveness 
of temperament which drives your romantic to seek his theme 
in the far-away and the unfamiliar, in barbarous Outlands or 
Medireval Thules: "emotion stimulates imagination and is stimu-
lated by it in tum, and in so far as the free expression of natural 
human feeling in a poem is due to imaginative causes, it is to be 
reckoned as a romantic character, "-emotion, imagination, free 
expression of feeling; it is the familiar formula. Classicism, on 
the other hand, is intimately dependent upon reason: "the pre-
dominance of the rational and formal element in art results 
in the tendency known as classicism. " Predominance of reason 
necessarily means an especial concern with the peculiar instru-
ments of reasoning, namely, abstract ideas. But this involves, 
in the first place, loss of imaginative vividness and emotional 
stress, for both imagination and emotion are essentially concrete, 
not abstract; and in the second place, it involves the ever-
present endangering of that very character for which vividness 
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is sacrificed, and that is truth; for while truth is necessarily 
expressed in general terms, generality is by nature formal; and 
when we have to do with matters so capriciously elevated from 
the phenomenal world as are resthetic matters, then, more than 
elsewhere, is formality in danger of resolving into formalism. 
Classicism stresses form; but its peril is lest in our passion for 
formal perfection we lose our sense for fact. So Aristotle causti-
cally says of the Pythagoreans: H All the properties of numbers 
and scales which they could show to agree with the attributes and 
parts and the whole arrangement of the heavens, they collected 
and fitted into their scheme; and if there was a gap anywhere, 
they readily made additions so as to make their whole theory 
coherent. " 
It is just for the avoidance of like emptinesses that the 
"sense of fact" which we find in realism has come to be so 
valued a quality, says Professor Neilson. The sense of fact is 
the salt substance of literature, "lending steadiness to imagina-
tion and supplying material to reason," though "resulting, when 
it exists in isolation or excess, in its own characteristic kind of 
failure." The case is that imagination, reason, and the sense of 
fact must all be maintained in a happy proportionality if we 
are to have creations of the first value, and the quality which 
can so maintain them he finds in "intensity." The situation is 
presented in a quaint allegory: 
"Up the sides of Parnassus labour the would-be poets coming by the three 
main roads of imagination, reason,' and the sense of fact. Those who have 
arrived at the top are camped on that side of the plateau next the road by 
which they ascended, and the camps are called by the names Romantic, 
Classic, and Realistic. There are other roads and other camps, but so far we 
have concerned ourselves with only these three. The great leaders, however, 
are to be found, not in the heart of anyone of these camps, but, in proportion 
to their greatness, towards the middle of the plateau. The farther from this 
. great centre, the more partisan they become, and down the slopes on each side 
and out on the plains of prose one sees little figures waving their party banners 
and shouting their party cries, far from the summit of victory at whose centre 
is a great peace." 
The quality of "intensity" is, as it were, the radiance which 
suffuses thi(Parnassian height. If we wish for a more definite 
description; "It is what the modern critic means-when he 
means anything-by temperament. It is often called merely 
emotion, or feeling, or passion, "-though it is more than is 
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conveyed by anyone of these terms, being a kind of alembic 
quality whose one office is to redeem all other qUalities from 
dross. 
With these four qualities the centre of Professor Neilson's 
critical edifice is completed. They constitute a statement of 
the resthetic core of literary art. There are other qualities, 
-for example, he treats sentiment and humour; but these have 
to do with the ethical side of art, resthetics as affected by ethics, 
rather than with its untouched essence: sentiment builds up 
and humour criticises ideals of conduct rather than patterns of 
beauty, and hence these qualities are incidental in criticism. 
Beyond question, we have here an attractive platting of the 
"middle way." Inevitably we ask, is it satisfying? is it an 
adequate and workable philosophy of criticism? In order to 
answer such questions, we must, I think, resume our considera-
tion of the psychological theory which, with curious uniformity, 
underlies all these diverse critical excursions. 
v 
Professor Neilson, when he is seeking a text for his treatise, 
chooses a passage from Bacon's Great Instauration, to wit: "The 
best division of human leaming is that derived from the three 
faculties of the rational soul, which is the seat of learning. His-
tory has reference to the Memory, poesy to the Imagination, and 
philosophy to the Reason." In the light of this passage it is 
easy to see upon what support rests Professor Neilson's division 
of realistic, romantic, and classic; for the sense of fact, imagina-
tion, and reason in poetry are but the manifestations of the three 
faculties set in relief by Bacon's partition. 
Perhaps the most signal effect of Bacon's work has been the 
sense of form, and the form of the sense of form, which it has 
imposed upon modern critical thinking. Bacon developed, with 
great elaboration, his notion of the relation of the fields of leam-
ing to the faculties of the rational soul; and in that veritable 
incarnation of the spirit of the Enlightenment, L'Encyclopedie 
... ou Dictionnaire raisonne des Sciences, des Arts et des Metiers, 
as its title continues, . . . as explained by d' Alembert in the 
Discours preliminaire, Bacon's arrangement is made the model 
for the encyclopredic organisation of all human knowledge. The 
influence of this work upon later thought is wellnigh universal; 
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and certainly, in all branches of criticism, where perspective is 
essential to sound conclusions, the spirit of the Encyclopcedia is 
autocratic. 
Now it is quite obvious that Bacon's division, and the point 
of view which it has engendered, is a psychological one. Is the 
psychology true and sufficient? This is our inevitable question; 
and if the achievements of psychological science in modern 
times are in any degree to be taken seriously, it has only to be 
asked to be answered in the negative. For the psychologist of 
to-day, though he rna y still use the notion of faculties in his 
provisional analyses, is perfectly aware of their fictive nature. 
For him the human mind is not a thing to be dissected, part from 
part, the parts duly prepared and labelled, and then properly 
exhibited in museum array; rather, he conceives it as a living 
reality, whose action is always one and simple though its de-
scription may be many and complex; it is not a composite struc-
ture of faculties, nor yet of states; it is growing and adaptive 
and unifying, as are all forms of life, and its essence is its opera-
tion. As it is with the mind, so is it with experience as a whole, 
and especially with those products of experience by which we 
judge what is essential humanity. 
Now if we turn from the psychologist to the critic, what 
do we find? In the first place, an ostensible psychologising of his 
subject-matters, a passage from the "outer" to the "inner," 
from the stimulus to the experience; and in the second place, no 
accompanying understanding of psychological problems. I The 
psychology of Bacon and the Medirevalists is still all-sufficient 
for the commentators upon art; they still discourse in terms of 
wits and faculties quite oblivious of the changed intentions which 
scientific progress has brought to these terms; and they fail 
utterly to apply, and apparently to grasp, the conception of mind 
and its creations, which, I venture to affirm, is not only the 
modem, but also the conception of the best of the Greeks, for it 
iSiPlato who tells us that "being is power," and Aristotle who 
says that /I actuality is work, action, " and who defines the soul as 
actuality. : 
I Dr. Eastman does recognise the more modem view, but he makes no 
essential use of it. "Probably any theory which regards the laboratory 
analysis of our experience into emotion, sensation, affection, image, idea, and 
so forth, as a final truth, will itself prove but temporary. We are safer when 
we talk of experience as a whole." 
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Plutarch, in one of his catechetical paragraphs, asks how 
many are the senses, andi~responds that according to the Stoic 
school there are five-sight, hearing, taste, smell, touch,-but 
that Aristotle adds to these a "common sense" whose business 
it is to perceive the compounded forms given us by the represen-
tations of the special senses, and likewise to reveal those de-
velopments in nature which appear in our perceptions of change. 
This sixth sense exercises an hegemony over all the others, 
from the simple fact that it alone deals with that actuality 
of action which is the essential being at once of outer na-
ture and of the soul-a fair and pragmatic reason, by the way, 
why it should be the lineal source of our own prized "common 
sense." 
Now the critics seem all to cleave to the decadent Stoic 
psychology. When they are dealing with the physical senses 
only, as in the case of Lessing, their conclusion may be, as Les-
sing's is, a sound if narrow theory. But when they would pass 
from this external and safe province to the more central facts of 
resthetic experience, their dangers are multiplied and, we fear, 
their weaknesses made evident. In the cases resumed we have 
illustration. Mr. Babbitt's theory rests upon antitheses of sense 
and intellect, emotion and will, which govern his conceptions and 
determine his formulre,-as if there could be intellect devoid of 
. sense, or will apart from feeling, or either pair in independence of 
the other. Mr. Neilson has memory, imagination, and reason in 
Baconian compartments of the mind, ready to serve as the proper 
keys to resthetic intelligibility. Mr. Fairchild, after postulating 
an indefinable thing-in-itself called feeling, as the essence of 
poetry, proceeds to divide a material of phantasma from a com-
bining-form of poetic intelligence; and so deems that he has 
marked out for us some advance in some direction worth pur-
suing. Finally, Mr. Eastman would compound poetry of sense-
perception, emotion, and memory, leaving will and intellect to be 
the concern of the man of affairs. The pertinent question is, 
to what does all such criticism lead? The classifications which 
it engenders are not true; it cannot define the proper themes or 
modes of resthetic creation; and it can hardly be expected to give 
reliable guidance to our tastes. The total impression which it 
conveys, after one has taken time for sober analysis of its mean-
ing, is of the substitution of eloquent but empty" abracadabras" 
for the familiar term "spade"; and the lesson it conveys is, if 
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anything, the reiteration of Lessing's wise caution: "Nichts ist 
betruglicher als algemeine Gesetze fur unsere Empfindungen." 
VI 
But though we condemn the psychology of the critics, as 
antiquated and inadequate, there is another point of yiew, which 
is, indeed, a prior point of view, fr.pm which-their conclusions 
may be judged. The prior view is -the philosophical, and it raises 
a question which may reasonably be regarded as essentially 
precedent to such psychological discussion of the boundaries 
of the arts as is found in the Laokoon and similar treatises. 
We will take our departure from the current conceptions of 
"romantic" and "classic," giving to these terms as precise an 
interpretation as tHeir customarily loose employment will per-
mit. The sharp antithesis of sense and intellect, feeling and will, 
imagination and reason, we must reject as inherently false, and 
conducive only to hypostatical idols and epithetical combats. We 
will thus avoid such absurd prejudgments as that sensible beauty 
is necessarily inferior to intellectual because sense is in some 
mystical meaning" lower" and intellect" higher" ; or that unions 
of sense and intellect which we demand in poetry, under the 
forms of imagination and reason, are impure and bastard when 
they occur in musical art; or that emotion is a thing that can 
be operated upon and cured by will, rather than an intrinsic 
phase of volitional experience. These are assumptions which 
spoil our tempers without advancing our wisdom; and since they 
are grounded in unreality we will pass them by, and we will tum 
to inquire what legitimate philosophical meanings underlie our 
terms. 
As I see it, the metaphysical burden conveyed by "romantic 
versus classic" is that of the particular as contrasted with the 
general or of the changing as opposed to the changeless. The 
two terms denote attitudes toward experience and methods of 
presenting impressions derived from nature. Neither method 
has any prerogatory claim as the vera causa either of knowledge 
or of beauty, and each must prove its own value. Nor is either 
justly condemned by pointing out, for example, that the romantic 
affection of mind is neither humble nor economical, or that the 
classical purchases its clear and distinct definition by confining 
itself to superficial ideas, while its immaculate form is only the 
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rigor mortis that for a moment preserves the aspect of life from 
imminent decay. Such judgments do not condemn until we have 
first inquired whether arrogance and wastefulness, superficiality 
and mechanical rigidity are sins and are avoidable; and these 
questions we cannot answer until we know under what conditions 
knowledge and beauty are humanly attainable, and, I may add, 
in what sense they are good. 
We must resume, in other words, the Greek mode of criticism, 
which was an ethical mode, but ethical in the most philosophical 
sense. I do not mean that we should parrot the Greeks, prig-
gishly asserting, as some do, that they have once for all uttered 
all that can worthily be said. There is rather every reason why 
we should avail ourselves of that distinction of moral and res-
thetic which we see and which they failed to see, so that in place 
of )('(xAax!l:,(X6((X we shall discuss )('C%AOY )(.(Xt a,cx66y, seeking to de-
termine their likeness and difference in the total ordination of 
experience. And having placed our criticism upon such basis as 
this, we shall then surely be able to appraise our activities with 
a more certain justice. 
This conception of criticism is not "classical" in the current 
sense; but it is, I believe, true to the Greek mode. For it is 
difficult to imagine any Greek condemning the principle of 
evolution as our modern "classicists" condemn it, or yet propos-
ing that separation of man and nature of which we make so 
much. Our classicists are too often men made timid by posses-
sions, fearful of venturing the new lest they cease to prize what 
they already have; and the romanticist is to them a man gone 
mad with arrogant ambitions. It is as if the heavy saurians of 
Mesozoic ages were to reproach the first of the winged tribe 
because of their aspiration: "Behold us," they would say, "are 
we not perfect? our articulate scales, our iridescent armour, 
shield and crest and serrate spine,-could aught be more beauti-
ful? And ye-scant-feathered, toothless, beaked,-what seek 
ye in the empty air? The stable and occupied earth is the proper 
abode of temperate life!" We can imagine what Plato would 
say in reply to this, for he utters it in a great passage-the figure 
of the winged horses and the charioteer and the period of thrice 
ten thousand years of effort to attain to the divine vision, whereof 
the memory is such that he who recalls it, forgets his earthly 
affairs and is rapt in the divine, while the vulgar deem him mad 
and upbraid him, seeing not that he is inspired. 
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Nor will our modern classicists, I imagine, derive much 
comfort from Plato in their notion that discursive and dichoto-
mising reason is the prime support of intelligence, for it is the 
master of dialectic himself who says that when" all philosophers 
with one voice assert mind to be king of heaven and earth, in 
reality they are but magnifying themselves." The truth is, as 
Plato of all men most persistently recognised, there is more than 
one form of human experience and more than one form of know-
ledge. Reason is one such form, and none judges it more highly 
than did Plato; but there are other forms that cannot be expressed 
in the discourse of reason. 
Can they be expressed, and do they deserve expression, in the 
discourse of the arts? This is a metaphysical question and it 
must be answered by metaphysical considerations. It was Pas-
cal, I believe, who defined metaphysics as "a sophisticated 
poetry." A countryman of Pascal's, writing of Greek poetry, 
gives the obverse and truer statement: La metaphysigue est 
Z'dme de toute poesie. And if metaphysics is the soul of all 
poetry, is it not evident that our modern critics must become, 
what the great critics of antiquity were, metaphysicians first 
and judges of literature afterwards? Nor will any critic so 
equipped feel that his humanism is imperilled because our modern 
understanding of nature, far more penetrating than that of any 
Greek, has vastly extended our conception of human endeavour. 
Rather he will feel that this expansion of our mortal prospect is a 
challenge to our powers of expression, and judging our modern 
art by the greatness of the demands made upon it rather than 
by the weakness with which it too often meets these demands, 
he will prophetically see its bright future and inspiringly guide 
it upon the path of attainment. 
HARTLEY B. ALEXANDER. 
University of Nebraska. 
